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Abstract 
This article advances the conceptualisation of conversations on state-building by examining 
gendered discourses. By focusing on specific historical moments in Rwanda and Kenya, this 
article analyses how „respectable femininities‟ and „wayward sexualities‟ become the „sites‟ 
where national and state politics are ritualised and where tensions resulting from non- 
hegemonic performances of both gender and sexuality are resolved. I argue that by examining 
sites of gendered cultural production, it is possible to trace how gendered tensions are enacted 
through localised practices and discursive mechanisms deployed to manage political 
differences and build solidarity within heterogeneous groups. The ritualisation and creation of 
ethno-national homogeneity as part of state-building conversations occurs at the expense of 
greater freedoms for women. Fundamentally this article posits that gendered cultural and 
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traditional norms are essential sites from which to map state-building conversations and 
should not be cordoned off to the realm of social and therefore excluded from the political. 
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The trajectories of state-building in the African continent are complex and this is grounded in 
an uneven colonial process. The processes associated with the formation of new states 
invariably meant the disruption of existing modes of life and vast displacement that was often 
accompanied by slavery, plunder, genocide, warfare and rebellions. While there are debates 
about how much we can directly connect the ongoing economic, political and social 
challenges to the legacies of colonialism, it is important to acknowledge that European 
colonialism drew colonies into new relationships with their socio-economic and political 
frameworks. The process of European colonialism in building hegemonies of systems of 
knowledge, framing how we think about states and societies today, cannot therefore be 
ignored. While this article does not intend to rehearse the connection between colonialism, 
capitalism and neo-liberalism, it is fundamental to how we think about dominant theories of 
the state, on the one hand, and relationships within the state, on the other hand, including 
those that are gendered. 
Drawing on the concept of conversation, this article advances some thoughts on 
conversations on gender, recognising that these are „not restricted to structured, overt, verbal 
dialogues or exchanges between a variety of actors within society. Rather, the focus is on 
wide-ranging interactions which are often unstructured, unseen, inexplicit and violent‟.
1 
By 
extending the notion of conversation beyond actions that occur through recognised methods  
in formal policy-making spaces, we can begin to centre excluded groups and actions that are 
significant but hitherto uncaptured in state-building discourses. Discussions on state-building 
often fail to account for the ways in which gender identities and resources are mobilised. 
Reflections about power and the actors involved in peace- and state-building processes either 
proceed from assumptions about gender relations as neutral or the negation of the active 
participation of certain citizens as political actors. 
Often, the distinctions on which citizens are excluded are informed by class, race and 
gender, but in any configuration, women tend to be excluded. Understanding this exclusion 
through theories around policy-making in the state introduces some engagement with power, 
actors and institutions. Writing about political life in sub-Saharan Africa, Chazan et al. 
articulated what is evidently not unique to Africa, which is the fact that policies evolve out of 
a  complex  web  of  social  forces,  institutional  settings  and  inter-personal     relationships.
2 
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Scholarship that has relied on suggesting African exceptionalism when it comes to the 
influence of the „deep state‟ in public policy-making, often as evidence of rudimentary state- 
building, has been debunked by in-depth understandings of how „formal lobbying   structures‟ 
within „developed democracies‟ play the same role that so-called informal powerful networks 
play in politics in the sub-Saharan context.
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The exception may lie in the „regulation‟ of 
organised political interest groups, which becomes difficult to manage in a context where  
their influence is not formally acknowledged. Understanding the state and political life in 
post-conflict contexts must therefore situate the informal and formal social structures that 
evolve in competition and/or conflict with those presented by state actors. Primary amongst 
these considerations are the actors that surround policy-making structures within the state and 
therefore those that are isolated from them. 
Fanon argued that political isolation – in his case focusing on rural producers – is 
shaped by a separation of interests, with policies pursued by those in power intended to 
promote the political disorganisation of the peasantry.
4 
Bates, reflecting on the political 
economy in rural Africa, noted that members of a single social group must first use the power 
of the state to compel them to pursue common interests.
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The need to access state trappings 
therefore provides the impetus for organising around their common interests. Both Fanon and 
Bates situate the different power dynamics at play in how excluded groups either respond to 
and/or engage with policy processes that frame their subalternity. Fanon‟s assertion about 
policy processes that are geared towards destabilising the organising capacities of sub-groups 
suggests a decision network characterised by a web of decisions taking place over a long 
period of time and extending far beyond the initial policy-making process. Policies are 
therefore changed not on merit but due to shifts in key actors who introduce  different 
agendas. Due to patron-client relations that characterise political processes, actors often 
intercede to try and modify, delay or terminate the implementation of policy programmes 
considered to negatively affect the interests of their respective constituencies.
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The power   of 
male actors is associated with their physical proximity to the heart of the national political 
process, therefore women as a constituency are relatively powerless because of their 
remoteness. Women‟s vulnerability to exploitative policies therefore rests in their distance 
from power, including the power to coerce. Yet, women remain in conversation with policy 
actors at the centre, often „talking back‟ through covert means and experiences that are not 
insignificant for the state-building project. It is this nexus between policy-influencing and 
making by formal and informal actors as the site for building and/or negating power bases in 
state-building projects that this article considers. If the argument is that women‟s distance 
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from power bases increases their isolation, can theorisations of policy-making account for the 
invisible gender conversations that entrench women‟s powerlessness and the gendered labour 
mobilised to frame them as political actors. I juxtapose two country case studies to highlight 
these gendered discourses in state-building projects and illustrate how attentiveness to these 
debates can shift how formal spaces interested in thinking about gender in the state do so. 
 
Why Rwanda and Kenya 
This is not a comparative study. In looking at Rwanda and Kenya, the goal is to draw  
attention to how gendered discourses emerge, evolve and take shape when conflict mobilised 
around ethnic identity results in violent outcomes. Both countries have had significant turning 
points in their sociopolitical history. For Rwanda, this is the genocide and post-genocide 
period from 1994, while in Kenya the 2007–2008 post-election crisis was a critical turning 
point. It is worth repeating that the events that led to the genocide and the post-election crisis 
in Rwanda and Kenya respectively have their roots in much longer historical trajectories, 
which this article will not delve into in any depth. However, for purposes of analysis, this 
article will use these moments as the basis for a discussion on the meaning of gendered labour 
in post-conflict settlements and state-building. This article focuses on militarisation and 
accompanying forms of militarised masculinities in redefining these gendered outcomes 
during the political junctures identified in the case studies. To do this, I examine the function 
of discourses in the production of gendered states and how this manifests in state and society 
narratives. The central argument is that in paying attention to speech acts, how they travel and 
the institutions that validate them, we trace how gender discourses make their way into policy 
positions and therefore re-inscribe conservative, powerless gender norms rather than advance 
the gender disruption created by conflict. Given the moments I focus on in these countries, the 
key question is which institutions are considered powerful in the circulation of gendered 
discourses and their uptake as legitimate narratives in the state-building process.
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I focus on 
violence as a regulatory mechanism and how this operates both discursively and practically, 
as well as the role of memory and truth/s, as critical to state-building narratives. 
 
Thinking gender and the state 
Feminist theorisations on gender and nation states foreground the duality of women and 
violence; where women represent a continuous and potential site of violence that is not only 
rooted  in  the  context  of  „war‟  but  also  exists  outside  of  that  framework.  In  situating  a 
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normalised zone (the home, the street, the work place) as an active site of violent conflict in 
the state, feminist scholars have destabilised the popularly held notion of peace and conflict as 
distinct realms.
8 
This is grounded in an understanding that violence is an important way 
through which gender and social difference is maintained to sustain the exploitation of 
women‟s reproductive and productive labour.
9 
Consequently, women as the carriers/bearers  
of collective identity and honour both personally and collectively face immense pressure  
when these collectivities are under threat.
10 
A variety of cultural, legal and political discourses 
and policies are deployed to construct the boundaries of the collective. 
A central dimension to these policies is concerned with the „genetic pool‟ of the nation, 
thus the control of marriage, procreation and, therefore, women‟s sexuality tend to be high on 
the nationalist agenda.
11 
Women‟s citizenship becomes an area of regulation because women 
occupy an insider/outsider position in relation to citizenship, which may be heightened by  
class but occurs across class strata. On the one hand, women will be included in the general 
body of citizens when politically expedient but, on the other hand, rules, regulations and 
policies specific to managing their citizenship will exist.
12 
Most states use both land and  blood 
criteria to codify and practice citizenship rules. The privileging of blood in citizenship rules 
goes hand in hand with the masculinisation of descent.
13 
Therefore, the state will permit 
fathers, but not mothers, to pass citizenship on to their children and husbands, but not wives,  
to pass citizenship on to their spouses. It is this insider/outsider relationship to citizenship of 
the nation and state that explains how violence against women becomes an important 
patriarchal tool to both discipline and therefore forge gender identities. Examined in this way, 
we move away from a debate on inclusion to one that examines the conditions that generate 
gender difference and violence as critical to power. 
In contexts where the mobilisation of sectional interests relies on ethno-nationalism, 
consolidation processes are closely linked to the ways in which sexual violence against 
women, but also sometimes against men, is deployed during violent conflict. Aggressive 
notions of masculinity, which are especially evoked in times of war and crisis, become 
fundamental features of „hegemonic masculinity‟, even if they contradict the ideas and the 
practice of many men. The term „hegemonic masculinity‟ developed by R.W. Connell refers to 
four basic patterns of how men deal with one another: hegemony, subordination, complicity 
and marginalisation.      Men behave hegemonically if they exclude or subordinate women and 
„lower-ranking‟ men, and ensure their own dominance by possession of weapons and the use 
of violence.
14 
Ratele‟s concept of ruling masculinity expands this conceptualisation, by using 
the categories of age and income, to examine the relationship of non-hegemonic males to 
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reigning ideas of maleness.
15 
It is within this framework that understanding violence against 
men is useful. 
State- and nation-building processes that redress gender inequalities require wide- 
ranging conversations about women‟s freedoms that not only focus on the dynamics generated 
by conflict but also address the factors that reorganise structures that position women as 
secondary to men. This also requires a concomitant conversation on the ways in which violent 
masculinities are produced and sustained before, during and after conflict. It is in this context 
that the vehicles through which gendered discourses are produced in the state become critical. 
Complementing feminist theories of the state, the notion of memory and truth is also critical to 
how we read discourse production in the case studies explored in this article. 
 
Memory and truth/s 
Scholars writing from different disciplinary traditions have explored the notion of memory 
and multiple truths as a route to understanding marginalisation and/or specific socio-political 
moments. Cohen and Atieno Odhiambo, reflecting on oral narratives and memory, argue that: 
„[it is not so much about] the power of “a truth”, or “the truth” but rather a claim to truth‟.
16 
The circulation of „truth‟ in everyday speech makes it less about how well something is 
argued, evidence offered or whether it happened but more about how readily and commonly it 
was spoken about.
17 
Musila advances the conceptual utility of rumour in the same vein as 
Cohen, arguing that rumour offers an influential genre of knowledge production, contestation 
and critique in African societies that challenges single-lens conceptions of credible 
knowledge.
18 
Advancing this function of power and discourse is Macharia‟s notion of  
political vernaculars in Kenya: 
 
Political vernaculars name real issues, but they also manage how those issues are 
handled. […] Instead, Kenya’s dominant political vernaculars shepherd or funnel us 
into predictable ends, generating two related demands: that the bad thing stop and 
that the good thing continues. 19 
 
Put together these scholars illustrate the importance of power in the discursive and its 
function in achieving specific nation- and state-building objectives. Macharia‟s notion of 
political vernaculars is useful in examining the ways narratives become taken for granted 
within the Kenyan state leading to pre-determined outcomes and therefore possibilities. 
Cohen‟s and Musila‟s conceptualisation of the utility of rumour is useful in examining how 
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stereotypes led to the escalation of gendered violence in the context of the Rwandan genocide. 
The section that follows focuses on how the ideas explored above have played out in nation- 
and state-building conversations in Kenya and Rwanda. 
 
Gender, genocide and Rwanda 
Gallimore, writing on the Rwandan genocide, illustrates how gendered linguistic and  
historical norms were rewritten and reproduced as essential tropes to support the genocide.
20 
Rwanda‟s history is framed as a class struggle between Hutu and Tutsi communities, with the 
economic dominance of the Tutsis shaped by ownership of cattle, which are seen as a measure 
of wealth, as opposed to the Hutus as a farming community. However, these class differences 
were managed through systems of social and political mobility where access to capital was 
gained through practices such as Ubuhake – the process of acquiring cattle – or marriage to a 
Tutsi woman from a rich aristocratic family amongst others.
21 
The colonial experience altered 
the relationship between gender, social identity and social mobility, producing one in which 
the linkages between gender and the production of ethnic boundaries become more 
pronounced. The conversion of class distinctions into ethnic ones resulted in power 
supremacy tensions, capitalised on by the colonial powers, which crystallised on more than 
one  occasion  into  a  violent  politics  of  the  „other‟.  Consequently,  the  rejection  of mixed 
marriages between Hutu men and Tutsi women during the months preceding the 1994 
genocide became an important part of this narrative. Jones in Gallimore notes how pre- 
genocide mobilisation revived many colonial images of beauty attributed to Tutsi women and 
manipulated them to create a sexualised enemy to be demystified and punished by rape.
22 
This was evident in the „Hutu Ten Commandments‟, published by the extremist journal 
Kangura, in which fear of the Tutsi woman was emphasised. Tutsi women therefore 
represented a permeable boundary that had the potential to infiltrate the Hutu. In part the 
commandments read: 
 
[…] consider a traitor any Muhutu who: marries a Tutsi woman; befriends a Tutsi 
woman; employs a Tutsi woman as a secretary or a concubine. Every Muhutu should 
know that our Hutu daughters are more suitable and conscientious in their role as 
woman, wife, and mother of the family.
23 
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Scholars writing about ritualised practices, of which marriage and sex acts form a part, 
indicate that rituals as concepts, and conceptual categories that comprise and organise 
knowledge, are neither abstract in nature nor independent of the body; instead, they are 
directly or indirectly embodied.
24  
The continual production and reproduction of „culture‟  and 
„tradition‟ through ritual practices occurs through social practices that are seen to define 
sociable beings. The body is therefore a site where „the most minute and local social practices 
are connected to large-scale organisation of power‟.
25 
The body therefore becomes a political 
field upon which power relations have an immediate hold: „they invest it, mark it, train it, 




females are correctly seen as literally the entry point through which the pure content 
may be adulterated, while males are treated as pores through which the precious stuff 
may ooze out and be lost, the whole system being thereby enfeebled.
27 
 
If we apply this lens to the altered relationship between marriage and social mobility in 
Rwanda, marriage to a Tutsi woman was read as an act of treason and a rejection of one‟s 
Hutu identity. Douglas argues that symbols associated with sexual danger, in this case 
marriage across communities, mirror the hierarchy and symmetry that apply to larger social 
systems.
28 
Therefore, the same impulse to impose order that brings these rituals into existence 
can also be supported by continually modifying or enriching them.
29 
The Rwandan experience above illustrates the ways in which narratives that frame 
community memory and identity, which are embodied through practices named as „culture‟ 
and „tradition‟, can be mobilised towards various state-building processes. The manipulation 
of  „culture‟  is  evident  during  moments  of  „moral  panic‟  or  crises,  particularly       when 
community „boundaries‟ are challenged. When a community faces an „external‟ threat, 
internal solidarity is fostered.
30 
This internal solidarity is negotiated and solidified through 
women‟s bodies and their sexualities, leading to heightened vigilance and surveillance of 
reproduction, marriage, birth, sex and sexuality. Women‟s bodies and their control is key to 
maintaining the boundaries of the ethno-nation or of the state. Rwanda is not unique, in the 
sense that the use of extreme forms of sexual violence against women has historically formed 
an important part of genocidal practices in addition to greater controls that are placed on 





Gender and the post-election crisis in Kenya 
The goals of state-building in times of crisis often determine the nature of discourses and, 
therefore, the policies that follow to control women‟s bodies and freedoms. In Kenya, the 
mobilisation of marriage and children across ethnicity was used in two main ways. The first 
prominent way was during the post-election crisis in 2007, where individuals in mixed 
marriages felt that their security was at greater risk. During this period, myth, rumour, past 
and current history, were invoked as „evidence‟ of the importance of visible, ethno-national 
boundaries. Legends such as Luanda Magere,
31 
and rumours around the „risks‟ associated 
with mixed ethnic marriages, were used to justify why marriage to „outsiders‟ must be 
avoided. Mixed marriages were framed as constituting a danger to the ethno-nation and 
women as a potential threat to the ethno-nation through the subversion evident when women 
exercise choice. The testimony below is illustrative: 
 
A Luhya woman married to a Kikuyu was abandoned by her husband on 30 December 
[2007]. He returned two days later and threatened to kill her, and sodomise her, 
saying he regretted marrying a Luhya, he threw her belongings out of their house, and 
refused to let her see her children 
 
Thou shall belong to your father’s tribe. If your father is Giriama and Mother is Kisii, 
you are Giriama. If a woman who is, say, from Taita father and Pokomo mother is 
married to a man who is Embu, their kids shall be Embu. That not only makes sense 
traditionally in all cultures but also is the only natural way to preserve our tribes.
32 
 
The greater loss to the ethno-nation was cited in terms of being unable to rely on and 
mobilise progeny from such relationships towards the goal of the ethno-nation, as was shown 
by the „outsider‟ woman‟s loyalty to „her people‟. Aversion to the „outsider‟ woman is thus 
enforced by a control and surveillance discourse rooted in patriarchy and patriliny. The 
inability to control the gene pool through the introduction of a foreigner who cannot be  
trusted is informed by an ethno-nationalist narrative that can only be sustained through a false 
notion of „purity‟. Yet, the resolution of conflicts that arise from ethno-nationalism are also 
known  to  mobilise  marriage  and  women‟s  reproduction.  As  biological  producers  of 
children/people, women are also bearers of the collective within these boundaries. Often, their 
primary identities within these collectivities override those they have as women.
33 
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The public discourse generated by the experiences above made it clear that patriarchal 
heterosexual systems would be the only route through which children would be conferred the 
full benefits of their ethno-nation. Attempts to expand the notion of the Kenyan nation in 
opposition to the ethno-nation were rejected. The fact that discursive and physical threats 
resulted in the rejection of a global Kenyan-ness at this moment of crisis is critical in a  
context where the constitution offers expanded citizenship rights to women. This means that a 
non-Kenyan man married to a Kenyan woman can acquire Kenyan citizenship and children 
borne out of these unions can also acquire dual citizenship. Legality was subverted in the 
public domain at a moment when corralling sectional interests was key. Policy positions that 
gave women specific rights that would destabilise narrow definitions of communities were 
easily quashed through a retreat to culture and tradition, which relies on homogeneity and 
patriarchy as the locus of power. 
The resurgence of „ethnicity‟ as an identity from which self-location occurred during 
Kenya‟s post-election crisis in 2007 heightened the need to „defend the tribe‟ and associated 
markers and symbols of the ethnic group. Thus, debates about women‟s sexuality in general 
and reproduction specifically came into sharp focus. The political moment offered insight into 
how moments of crisis in Kenya‟s history have contributed to the resurgence of debates on 
women‟s sexuality and are subsequently mobilised towards ethno-national aspirations and 
agendas within the state. Given that ethno-nationalism is often mobilised around the fictions 
of „purity‟ and „homogeneity‟, during crisis regimes often retreat into „conservative‟ 
definitions and reconstructions of masculinities and femininities. These moves are often an 
attempt to construct a homogeneous „us‟ versus „them‟ for purposes of political negotiation. 
The reassertion of „culture‟ and rites, which are articulated as disembodied, free of gendered 
tensions and interpreted as localised practices become important vehicles to enforce this 
ethno-national homogeneity. Similarly, discourses are deployed ritualise political differences 
and build solidarity within what are always heterogeneous communities. The control of 
women‟s bodies at these moments becomes essential, since they are deployed towards the 
service of the nation. As such, questions have been raised about the possibilities of women 
being able to dissociate themselves from kinship and ethnic boundaries to coalesce into a 
force that is primarily shaped by their identity as women during post-conflict reconstruction 
processes. 
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Phallocracy and the state 
The production of model women and therefore femininities occurs alongside reifying very 
specific ideas about masculinity. In thinking about how we transform gender norms in state- 
building conversations, it is critical to examine the interaction between the construction of 
femininities and masculinities, and their effects on the performance of politics. Of interest  
here are the ways in which debates certain forms of masculinity become reified as central to 
political leadership. Alongside this is the production of violent masculinities in the periphery 
of the state. One of the prominent ways in which hetero-patriarchal male-centricity is evident 
in political leadership is through discussions about manhood. The association made between 
masculinity, manhood and politics has been a dominant feature of public speech acts of 
Kenyan politicians. While it can be argued that statements of this nature form part of the 
common rhetoric associated with electoral politics, their affirmation in popular discourses 
serve the purpose of producing them as evidence of a direct relationship between hegemonic 
masculinities and leadership, authority and control. 
The circulation of statements such as Kama wewe ni dume (If you are a bull) – 
references to uncircumcised men as „unprepared‟ for leadership – as well as instances of 
forced circumcision during the post-election crisis form part of a larger process of producing 
violent heterosexual masculinities as key to state-building.
34 
There is a corollary between 
these utterances and the perceptions they enforce around women‟s leadership and the 
subsequent physical and verbal violence. Insinuations about sizes of manhood and whether 
they are circumcised or not form part of a broader narrative to infantilise men, distinguishing 
between „men‟ and „boys‟ and asserting cultural authority and power by invoking „culturally 
specific practices‟ such as male circumcision as superior and symbols of hegemonic 
masculinity. 
Violence, in serving a regulatory function, also contributes to normalising practices by 
categorising certain acts of violence as legitimate and others as illegitimate. The reliance on 
gender difference to produce these distinctions occurs through the acceptance of forced 
circumcision of men as forms of violence as invalid because it is male domination over other 
men. These acts therefore go un-reported and are not dealt with because it challenges reigning 
ideas about real men. Real men cannot be subjugated in such intimate ways. The connection 
between male circumcision and being a „real man‟ is linked to male bonding practices that 
occur during circumcision rites of passage within some communities, which serve to affirm 
hegemonic masculinities – strong, virile, fearless with authority over „weaker‟ men, boys  and 
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women. These ideas make their way into speech acts, which in turn shape sectional ideas 
about hegemonic masculinities. 
One of the ways in which speech acts translate into the production of violent 
masculinities is through the existence of political militias, which is an important part of the 
narrative around regime politics and masculinities in Kenya. The rise of political militias can 
be influenced by three main factors: regime tactics to manage power; groups with political 
interests challenging a regime‟s inability to develop inclusive socio-economic programmes; 
and groups capitalising on structural weaknesses (such as weak policing and socio-economic 
disparities) to develop criminal economies often in collusion with the state and/or parallel to 
the state. When regimes mobilise political militias into their service, whether they are called 
youth wings of political parties or crime preventers, this mobilisation is framed as a resolution 
to unemployment and thus co-opts the political choices of young men. The evolution of 
groups such as Sabaot Land Defence Force and Mungiki represent and account for the 
expansive mobilisation of violence for political and economic gains through sophisticated 
structures across geographical zones in Kenya. Both groups illustrate the interplay between 
socio-economic grievances as a starting point for organising identity as a basis for 
mobilisation and their mutation into political brokers, with violence as a key determinant of 
the power that they wield within communities as well as with politicians. 
There are risks associated with constructing poor, urban and/or rural men and the 
resolution of their marginality through the prism of violence, criminality and (in)security. 
Sustaining violent masculinities in this way has an impact on the production of young 
women‟s identities in these communities, which is framed by insecurity and fear of violence. 
Additionally, political elite develop ambiguous relationship with political militias 
characterised by either allowing the militia activities to go unfettered in exchange for their 
mobilisation capacity for political ends, such as the 2005–2006 referendum campaign. or 
crackdown on the militia activities. This ambiguity reaffirms rather than dismantles the 
production of dominant violent masculinities as important to conflict creation and/or 
resolution. 
Finally, the fact that militaries remain the last bastions of hyper-masculinity is not in 
dispute. They use and maintain the ideological construction of gender in the definitions of 
„masculinity‟ and „femininity‟. Women are widely cast in the role of „the protected‟ and 
„defended‟, often excluded from military service and almost always – whether in conventional 
or guerrilla armies – excluded from direct combat. This division – separating the protector 
from the protected, defender from defended – is crucial to both sexism and militarism.
35 
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This article does not offer an analysis of efforts to democratise military governance 
and what that has yielded in terms of shifting attitudes towards women in these institutions. 
This is largely because feminist scholarship on gender and militaries is ideologically split   on 
whether including women in an institution that is fundamentally framed by violence and 
coercion can in any way be liberatory for women and non-hegemonic men.
36 
I focus here on 
what exhibitions of militarised masculinities communicate to society about hegemonic 
masculinities, leadership and security. Macharia‟s notion of political vernaculars is useful    in 
framing how discourses on security when attached to militarisation serve a broader 
disciplinary function.
37 
Security or securing the nation becomes a political lexicon that 
mobilises fixed debates that are either about securing rights and freedoms of the excluded or 
about protecting the nation from external threats. In both instances, demands that are 
cultivated by this political vernacular restrict the possibilities of imagining different ways of 
securing freedom and security. 
Performances of militarised masculinity through military symbols are considered key 
signifiers of the relationship between the military forces and the state. However, it is the 
connection between military ideals of discipline, order and rank and the intersection between 
civilian forms of governance and the military that are important here, particularly in post- 
conflict settings. These factors interact to produce a heightened sense of militarism in society, 
which is accompanied by increased resource allocation to military budgets as well as a 
blurring of the lines between the role of the military in national security and that of domestic 
security forces. 
Since flag independence in 1963, Kenya has been governed by civilian leaders, thus 
making the distinction between the barracks and the Executive tidy, albeit complicated. 
Therefore, the regular appearance of the current president Kenyatta in military fatigues, as 
distinguished from ceremonial military wear, has raised questions about the separation of the 
military and the executive. This is largely informed by the fact that the military as an 
institution has a distinct culture that draws on symbols, which include dress and corporate 
culture, and relies on separation, evident in the distinction between ranks and a difference 
between disciplined forces and civilians anchored in their military training. These distinctions 
are important to the military‟s functioning. Daily military interaction is expressed, facilitated 
and regulated by symbols of the military culture. Examples include saluting as a gesture of 
respect and submission to military discipline, while uniforms act as symbols for identification 
and status amongst military personnel. 
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The constitutional separation of the military and civilian control over military forces  
as part of democratic processes is also critical to the separation of functions. Kenyatta‟s 
insistence on dressing in military uniform conflates the idea of a civilian commander in chief 
of the armed forces and military symbolism associated with the monopoly of violence. In 
adopting military gear, Kenyatta clearly seeks to associate very specific forms power that are 
connected to the military‟s control of the instruments of coercion with his authority as a  
leader of the country. The political vernacular produced by these actions emphasize a link 
between military symbols and security provisioning whilst erasing the multiple layers of 
insecurity that are disconnected from territorial integrity. While the president‟s choice of  
dress can be considered inconsequential and non-impactful, it has been accompanied by a 
greater  investment  in  a  stronger  security  discourse,  which  foregrounded  military-      and 
security-related expenditure, as the framework to manage the internally generated weaknesses 
harnessed by Al Shabaab.
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Rwanda often presents a gender dilemma. On the one hand, if the symbol of equality 
is to be found in good laws and the representation of women in public office, then Rwanda 
has surpassed this goal. However, the progressive laws and policies that provide equal access 
to land and the robust provision of marriage equality is informed by the impact of the 
genocide on the Rwandese population that led to a higher population of women. The 
Rwandese president has publicly acknowledged that the pursuit of gender equality is based on 
a logic of maximising on citizens irrespective of gender.
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Yet the cases of Victoire Ingabire 
Umuhoza and Diane Rwigara are instructive. Both these women ran for presidency and both 
were incarcerated on charges of treason. It is important to note that strong-arm responses to 
male candidates have occurred too but what stands out here is the mobilisation of gendered 
ideas on morality that were specifically deployed against these women. These notions of 
morality are in seen in the publishing of nude photos in Rwigara‟s case to the criminal 
charges against the family as part of subverting political ambitions, which are known to harm 
women in public office more than men because of societal notions of women‟s 
respectability.
40 
Umuhoza, on the other hand, was the head of the United Democratic Front- 
Inkingi opposition party. She was arrested in 2010 and charged with conspiracy to undermine 
the government as well as denying Rwanda‟s 1994 genocide and was sentenced to 15 years.
41 
She was released in 2018. 
Rwanda‟s history of genocide influences to a great degree how the state-building 
process has occurred – specifically the control of the instruments of government. The 
presidency is organised around tight control of civic space, which is sustained by militarised 
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masculinity. Militarised masculinity here refers to the mobilisation of norms that drive 
militaries such as deference to rank and authority, order, discipline and an acceptance that the 
use of force and violence are key to gendered order. This is applicable to men and women 
alike. From political repression, to national cleaning days, what one sees in Rwanda is the 
exercise of dominant hegemonic masculinity (keeping the history of violence in mind) whilst 
mobilising normative gender principles to resolve and manage a history where ethno- 
nationalism has been mobilised to violent ends. 
In considering how the production of hegemonic masculinities has an impact on 
resultant state policies and therefore the place of women and other non-hegemonic groups in 
any society, paying attention to national conversations on gender is key. These include: 
discourses that produce a distinction between boys and men as part of larger political rhetoric 
to assert male leadership; narratives that privilege cultural practices such as male circumcision 
as markers of male authority and the use of forced male circumcision during conflict; and 
political norms and practices that see the creation of political militias, often consisting of 
young male youth, framed as security providers or as a resolution to unemployment. These 
practices reinforce violence as a legitimate way in which maleness is understood in society 
and concomitantly how women and girls should interact with these forms of masculinity, 
which is often through fear and subordination. The production of these masculinities by the 
state are shaped by a stereotypical, collective consciousness that frames aggression and the 
propensity for violence as biological, with courage being attributed to men and passivity, 
peacefulness and motherliness to women. The projection of these as absolute models on both 
sides – soldier and statesman, on the one hand, and mother of the nation, on the other –sustain 
the deployment of youth as a category that describes young men as agents (with access to 
violence as a coercive tool) and young women as recipients of development to be  protected.
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If men are using violence and other forms of rent-seeking as a route then what routes are 
young women using to deal with exclusion and in what ways does that reinforce traditional 
ideas of masculinity and femininity and with what effect? Understanding how power operates 
is therefore integral to situating legitimate and illegitimate forms of gendered violence, the 





This article focussed on two case studies, Kenya and Rwanda, not necessarily to highlight 
correlations, draw comparisons and/or examine continuities around gender and state-building 
conversations. Rather, the intention was to examine what these case studies demonstrate  
about conversations of gender and state-building in moments of crisis. In both cases, 
discourses on gender identity are closely linked to the survival of the nation state and are 
therefore corralled around a set of cohesive discourses linked to purity and group survival. 
These discourses are enacted through culture, tradition and various forms of state and 
community-based violence, which serve as a regulatory tool. At the root of the regulatory 
discourses and the mobilisation of gender is a hetero-patriarchal state that arrogates the power 
to award and hold back full freedoms as part of this process. The arrogation of gendered state 
power is riddled with contradictions. 
Women and girls are mobilised as mothers, child bearers and nurturers to contribute to 
de-radicalising young men and sustain peace. Yet, at the same time an environment in which 
public spaces occupied by women are constricted whether this occurs through attacks of 
women in public office,
43 
stripping women in the streets for “indecent” dressing,
44 
and most 
potently through the failure to fulfil the gender equality provisions in the constitution. These 
actions are demonstrative of how violence serves to discipline women through fear and keep 
them in traditional gender roles. The structural belief that women who have „strayed‟ from 
their traditional roles should be violently guided back to their rightful place is implicit in these 
actions. 
Attacks on women and girls do not occur in a vacuum. As the Kenya case 
demonstrated, the increasing criminalisation of young men on the margins the country and the 
class dynamics that shape the disposability of young men‟s lives heighten violent 
masculinities. The daily insecurity faced by women is justified by the acceptance that  
enacting violence is synonymous with providing security. This belief is evident in the support 
granted to security forces and the reduction in civilian oversight in resolving the Al Shabaab 
crisis in Kenya. That state violence against marginalised communities is deemed justifiable 
pervades public debate in Kenya and illustrates how deeply militarisation discourses are 
embedded and expand the state‟s surveillance and containment strategies. Consequently, the 
relationship between discourses and practices of violence, militarisation and peace is key to 
disrupting gendered conversations on nation- and state-building. 
Finally, dominant responses that continue to place analytical value within structures 
(the law, parliament, human rights commissions) and the rights framework (through the 
constitution or national reconciliation processes) as the only way to think about  state-building 
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conversations are limited. Gender and sexuality contestations, whether through a focus on 
reproduction or respectable femininities, form the fulcrum for conversations, rumour, political 
vernaculars and re-inscribed truths around contested gendered identities and their place in the 
state. Approaches that are inattentive to the analytical opportunity evident in thinking about 
discourses and power as a route to developing effective policy do not begin to tackle the 
aspirations and the spaces where people retreat to „re-write identity‟. These spaces, I argue,  
are represented by „cultural practices‟ and, as Macharia notes, through political vernaculars 
that ring fence how progress, development and justice are framed, debated and therefore 
imagined in any state.
45 
Analytical blindness to these sites means that we do not begin to deal 
with how hetero-normativity, gendered identities and subjectivities are forged within  specific 
contexts. The dissociation of sexuality, women‟s bodies and reproduction as core transmitters 
of the „national‟ (ethnic) project „reads‟ the tribe in abstraction from the mechanisms that 
reinforce and sustain it. Tribe becomes political rather than a social construct that is deeply 
reliant on gendered labour to survive. That the mobilisation of gendered labour is political 
becomes subsumed in vernaculars that situate the political as only existing as „realpolitik‟. 
Finally, these conclusions can be translated into laws and policies but they predominantly live 
in the realm of the discursive, the everyday practices which are embodied and/or made visible 
by national debates about the place of women and men in the state and its future. It is in the 
quotidian that the rigidity and mobility of gender ideas acquire life and/or are destabilised. 
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